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Through the Alice Corp. Looking Glass:
Using Pragmatic Arguments to Bring
Predictability to Patent Law
By Jason B. Portis*
ABSTRACT
Within the last four years, multiple institutional actors that have largely remained
dormant in the scope of innovation policy and patents have undertaken a surprisingly
interventionist reform of patent law. Congress, administrative agencies, and the Supreme
Court have all recently shaped patent law to be more pragmatic and less overtly
formalistic. Conversely, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has staunchly
defended a formalist approach to patent law, advocating consistently for bright-line
rules.
The Federal Circuit has been charged with bringing predictability to patent law
since its creation in 1982. The Federal Circuit attempts to bring predictability and
uniformity through a largely rule-based formalist approach. Empirical evidence shows
that the Federal Circuit's rule formalism has actually decreased the predictability of
patent law. The Supreme Court's recent interventions into patent law show they are in
favor of a more pragmatic approach, favoring policy considerations over the adoption of
bright-line formalist rules.
The history of the Federal Circuit shows it was designed to be an institutional
body of expertise in patent law. This expertise was meant to serve two purposes, the first
was to bring predictability and uniformity to patent law. The second was to be a body
with not only the power to shape patent law, but the knowledge to shape it in accordance
with the goals and policies inherent in the Patent Act. This comment explains how recent
Supreme Court precedents regarding patent-eligible subject matter create a framework
for inculcating pragmatic, policy intensive arguments into traditionally rigid, formalistic
Federal Circuit jurisprudence. The framework becomes a vehicle for the Federal Circuit
to shape patent law in alignment with the pragmatic and social considerations derived
from innovation policy. This comment then illustrates how that framework can be applied
to bring predictability to other key areas of uncertainty in patent law.

Candidate for Juris Doctor, 2016, Northwestern University School of Law. Executive Editor,
Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property. I would like to thank Dr. Laura PedrazaFariña, Oleg Khariton, and Heather Moelter for their help, criticisms, and contributions. Additionally, I
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INTRODUCTION
¶1

¶2

The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ("CAFC") has been the subject of
scrutiny since its inception in 1982. Whether commentators are troubled regarding fears of
specialized judiciary1, the court’s confusing jurisprudence 2, or the unique and anomalous
nature of patent law itself 3, the Federal Circuit 4 is frequently a source of discussion and
debate. One of the points of contention for which the Federal Circuit is often criticized is
their reliance on a formalistic approach in deciding issues of patent law. 5 Many patent law
scholars have advanced their own views on the causes and rationales behind this rule based
approach, including its function in teaching trial court judges as well as its role in bringing
uniformity to patent law. 6 This comment does not seek to explain the formalist behavior,
rather only to view it as evidence of the lack of policy considerations in Federal Circuit
jurisprudence. 7
At a time when patent law is coming to the foreground, not just in the legal world,
but among the public at large 8, the specific values and merits on both sides of the patent
system should be evaluated and re-examined. Within the last four years, multiple
institutional actors that have largely remained dormant in the scope of innovation policy,
such as the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO"), Congress, and the Supreme Court,
have undertaken a surprisingly interventionist policy-based patent law reform. 9 These
See, e.g., Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1 (1989); Paul R. Gugliuzza, Rethinking Federal Circuit Jurisdiction, 100 GEO. L.J. 1437 (2012);
Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy, Rethinking Patent Law’s Uniformity Principle, 101 NW. U. L. REV.
1619 (2007); Judge Diane P. Wood, Keynote Address: Is it Time to Abolish the Federal Circuit’s Exclusive
Jurisdiction in Patent Cases?, 13 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 2 (2007).
2
See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington & Paulina Orchard, The Federal Circuit: A Model for Reform?, 78
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 575 (2010); Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, In Search of Institutional Identity: The Federal
Circuit Comes of Age, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 787 (2008); Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A
Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035 (2003).
3
See, e.g., Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent Cases?, 15
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2001); Robert Pitofsky, Challenges of the New Economy: Issues at the Intersection
of Antitrust and Intellectual Property, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 913, 921-23 (2001); Arti Rai, Addressing the
Patent Gold Rush: The Role of Deference to PTO Patent Denials, 2 WASH. U.J.L. & POL’Y 199 (2000).
4
The terms "Federal Circuit" and "CAFC" are often interchangeable. In this comment, "Federal
Circuit" will refer to the court as an institutional structure, while "CAFC" will refer to the court as an actor
in the jurisprudence of patent law.
5
See, e.g., Peter Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, 120 YALE L.J. 2 (2010); John R. Thomas,
Formalism at the Federal Circuit, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 771 (2003); Carl Tobias, The White Commission and
the Federal Circuit, 10 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 45, 58 (2000).
6
See, e.g., Laura G. Pedraza-Fariña, The Federal Circuit: An Expert Community Approach, 30
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 89 (2015); Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach
to Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035 (2003); John R. Thomas, Formalism at the Federal
Circuit, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 771 (2003).
7
See infra Part II.
8
See, e.g., Editorial, Clarifying, and Tightening, Patent Law, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/05/opinion/clarifying-and-tightening-patent-law.html
[http://perma.cc/C4AF-A4SR]; Adam Liptak, Two Rulings May Curb Lawsuits Over Patents, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 29, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/30/business/two-rulings-may-curb-lawsuits-overpatents.html[https://perma.cc/8CHX-RMDL]; Adam Liptak, Justices, 9-0, Bar Patenting Human Genes,
N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/14/us/supreme-court-rules-human-genesmay-not-be-patented.html [http://perma.cc/GYP9-BW54]; Charles Duhigg & Steve Lohr, The Patent, Used
as a Sword, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/08/technology/patent-warsamong-tech-giants-can-stifle-competition.html [http://perma.cc/CF3M-7U53].
9
See, e.g., Sarah Tran, Policy Tailors and the Patent Office, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 487, 508-17
1
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entities have viewed patent law as a holistic endeavor, considering factors such as:
maximizing economic efficiency, promoting follow-on innovation, and developing and
protecting the public storehouse of knowledge. 10 The Federal Circuit believes its formal
rule based jurisprudence brings uniformity and predictability to patent law, indeed some
commentators have supported this contention. 11 However, empirical evidence suggests that
formalism actually decreases precision; and that a more pragmatic approach would better
serve the goals of the CAFC. 12 This is not a comment that tells the Federal Circuit what
patent law should be. This is an analysis of the types of arguments used, which types of
arguments best achieve the goals of the specialized patent appeals court, and how to
implement the best arguments across the different doctrines of patent law.
Part I of this comment accomplishes two main points. First, it establishes that rulebased formalism is antithetical to adjudication that considers policy implications. Second,
it describes why precision is favorable and the empirical evidence that supports a pragmatic
approach to achieve precision over a rule-based formalistic approach. Part II walks through
the recent intervention of the Supreme Court into the area of patent-eligible subject matter.
This recent case law illustrates why a staunch entrenching against a policy inculcated
approach is countercurrent with the goals opined by rule formalism. Part III builds off the
example drawn in Part II to show how policy arguments can be integrated into other areas
of unpredictability in patent law to increase precision.
I. FORMALISM AND THE CAFC

¶4

The formalist, rule-based approach to patent law adjudication has led to increased
unpredictability in patent law. By inculcating policy arguments into patent law, greater
precision can be achieved.
A. Background & Formation of the CAFC

¶5

The Evarts Act, also known as the Judiciary Act of 1891, created the Courts of
Appeals as we know them today. 13 It reassigned the jurisdiction of routine appeals to
regional circuit courts. 14 During the congressional debates over the exact structure the new
appeals system, there was a discussion of creating a specialized patent court. 15 The benefit
would be a specialized court that would hear more patent law cases, and thus be in a better
position to render opinions that would promote innovation and societal progress. 16 This
proposal was tabled for lack of support in Congress; there were too many questions over
(2012)(Discussing the prioritization procedure of the PTO and its role in determining which technologies
have greater national importance.); Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284
(2011) (Largely shifting the United States from a first-to-invent-system to a first-to-file system, increasing
incentive to disclose innovations to the public.); Mayo Collaborative Servs., v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132
S.Ct. 1289 (2012)(discussed infra Part II) (respectively).
10
Discussed infra Part II.
11
See, e.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 1, at 8–14; Gugliuzza, supra note 1, at 1457-59.
12
Discussed infra Part I.
13
Judiciary Act of 1891, 26 Stat. 826 (1891).
14
See Judiciary Act of 1891, 26 Stat. 826 (1891).
15
See STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS, SENATE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., SINGLE COURT OF APPEALS—A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1 (Comm. Print 1959).
16
See id.
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how its appellate role would co-exist with the Supreme Court as required by Article III of
the Constitution.17 It was decided that discretionary review by the Supreme Court of final
patent decisions in the regional circuits would be sufficient to bring uniformity to patent
law. 18
Eventually, 91 years later, this specialized patent appeals court was created with the
Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982 (FCIA). 19 The problems inherent with patent law
had persisted for so many years, the need outweighed the concerns. 20 To solve the previous
concerns of those debating the Evarts Act, it was insured that the Supreme Court would
still be able to exert discretionary review over the newly christened Federal Circuit. 21
Additionally, the Federal Circuit had to take on additional responsibilities as part of the
compromise for its creation. 22 Regardless, the two main goals of the Federal Circuit were
clear: (1) to provide uniformity and predictability to patent law and (2) to be a body with
the necessary expertise to resolve patent disputes concurrently with the designs and
intentions of the Patent Act. 23 The question remains of how the Federal Circuit should
promulgate patent law arguments as to best achieve these goals.
B. Definitions for Formalism

¶7

¶8

Formalism, as used here, describes rule-based adjudication without consideration of
any other factors. Expressed another way, it is the “adherence to a norm’s prescription
without regard to the background reasons the norm is meant to serve.” 24 A logician who
follows formalism will act on the end result of the prescription of an algorithm without
regard to the purpose of the rule itself. 25 It is the purest example of form-over-function.
Legal scholars have noted that accurate decision making rarely involves pure
formalism. 26 Laws are rules that exist as derivatives of Congressional will, and they should
See id.; U.S. CONST. art. III. § 1, cl. 1.
See STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS, SENATE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., SINGLE COURT OF APPEALS—A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1 (Comm. Print 1959)
19
Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, 96 Stat. 25 (1982).
20
Justice Frankfurter cited the lack of public interest as the main reason for the lack of earlier
legislation to create a specialized patent court. “The layman knows little and cares less about patent
controversies.” Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 175 (1927).
Still, other notable judges had called for a specialized patent court decades earlier. Judge Learned Hand is
famous for his patent law jurisprudence prior to the creation of a specialized court. He remarked, “I cannot
stop without calling attention to the extraordinary condition of the law which makes it possible for a man
without any knowledge of even the rudiments of chemistry to pass upon questions such as these. The
inordinate expense of time is the least of the resulting evils.” Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189
F. 95 (1911). The Chief Judge for the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, William J. Graham, echoed
this sentiment, “While these patent[] cases are of vast importance to the industrial life of the country. .
.[s]ome of them cry to the very heavens with their aridity.” William J. Graham, The Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals, Its History, Functions, and Jurisdiction, FED. BAR ASS’N J., Oct. 1932 at 33,37.
21
See 28 U.S.C. §1254(1) (2006).
22
See id. §1295(a).
23
See, e.g., Hearing on S. 21 and S.537 Before the Subcomm. on Courts of the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 97th Cong. 211; Jack Q. Lever Jr., The New Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 64 J. PAT.
OFF. SOC’Y 178 (1982); Daniel J. Meador, Origin of the Federal Circuit: A Personal Account, 41 AM. U. L.
REV. 581 (1992).
24
See Larry Alexander, With me, It’s All ‘er Nuthin’: Formalism in Law and Morality, 66 U. CHI. L.
REV. 530, 531 (1999).
25
See id.
26
See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 208617
18
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be applied in a way that reflects the intent of the rule drafter. 27 Often times these rules
attempt to give solutions to problems that are unforeseen and unanticipated. In those cases,
reading the text of the rule rarely yields a complete answer. 28 In order to reach an end result
consistent with the drafter of the rule, “an inquiry into something other than the instructions
of the enacting legislature” must be made, other considerations must be taken. 29 In taking
“those other considerations, the institution entrusted with the decision must make reference
to considerations of both fact and policy.” 30
This is not to be confused with equating textualism to formalism, and by syllogism
regarding a textualist interpretation as one lacking qualifying considerations. 31 In
interpreting the text of a statute, natural assumptions are made. Practical reason coexists
with statutory interpretation, because a “complex judgment about how to best harmonize
text, legislative history, statutory purpose, and contemporary public policy” must be
made. 32 The take away message is that when other considerations are not made in
conjunction with applying the rule, the purpose of the rule itself ceases to have import.
C. Formalism Fails

¶10

As discussed supra, one of the greatest assets of a specialized patent court—apart
from the opportunity to use their specialization to influence policy—was the ability to bring
precision and uniformity to patent law. In terms of uniformity, it can hardly be argued that
the body of patent law is less uniform than before the FCIA of 1982. Prior to the creation
of the Federal Circuit, forum shopping at the trial court level in order to lie within an
appeals circuit with favorable patent laws was an all too common problem. 33 The fact that
only one appeals court now hears patent cases can undoubtedly be a mark of increased
uniformity. Precision is less concrete of a matter. Precision being defined here as Professor
Dreyfuss defined it in her seminal analysis of the Federal Circuit: precise as in reproducible
in a way that permits the PTO, lower courts, and other legal actors to apply it with ease.34
Patent law commentators and empirical evidence suggest that the CAFC’s formalistic
approach actually achieves less predictability than a pragmatic, policy inculcated approach.
¶11
Intuitively, one would think that a rule formalist approach would bring the uniformity
and precision desired by a specialized court for patent appeals. Indeed, the CAFC does not
hide the attempt to use bright-line rules at every turn. When an appellant attempted to
explain the difficulty of drafting a bright-line rule for patent-eligible subject matter, one
87 (1990) (“This assessment is not a mechanical exercise of uncovering an actual legislative decision. It
calls for a frankly value-laden judgment.”)
27
See id.; Alexander, supra note 24, at 531; Daniel Farber, The Inevitability of Practical Reason:
Statutes, Formalism, and the Rule of Law, 45 VAND. L. REV. 533, 541 (1992).
28
See Alexander, supra note 24, at 531; Farber, supra note 27, at 541; Sunstein, supra note 26, at
2086-87.
29
Sunstein, supra note 26, at 2086-87. See also Alexander, supra note 24, at 531; Farber, supra note
27, at 541.
30
Sunstein, supra note 26, at 2086-87.
31
See Farber, supra note 27, at 541.
32
Id.
33
See Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System, Structure, and Internal
Procedures: Recommendations for Change 58-59 (1975).
34
Dreyfuss, supra note 1, at 1 (“I consider whether the law is more precise, in the sense of being
reproducible—is the law articulated in a way that permits the PTO, lower courts, and practitioners to apply
it with greater ease.”)
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Federal Circuit judge responded, “How about a dim-line rule? Or any kind of rule?”35
These rule formalist precedents set by the Federal Circuit approaches have actually brought
less precision to patent law. 36
¶12
Commentators have argued that due to the nature of patent law, a lack of
predictability is to be expected, as it is inherent to the field. It was once noted that, “The
Patent system is strange and weird territory to most judges. They have never seen anything
that resembles it.” 37 However the uncertainty of patent law cannot be blamed on the trial
court judges alone. 38 Statistical analysis shows increased variance in the percentage of
patent cases successfully appealed since the creation of the Federal Circuit. 39 Under a
general assumption that the motivations under which parties select fact scenarios for appeal
have remained roughly constant, an increase in the variability of successful appeal rates
means that parties have less prediction power in Federal Circuit decision making. 40
Therefore, “the Federal Circuit and its doctrinal changes have brought less certainty and
predictability to patent enforcement.” 41 Even if the district courts frequently err in claim
construction—getting reversed on appeal under de novo review 42—increased variance
should only occur if the parties involved in litigation cannot predict the outcome of
appellate claim construction. 43 Theoretically, de novo review would increase the
predictability of appellate claim construction in comparison to a level of fact-finding
deference. 44 Therefore, the imprecision must lie with the practice and procedure of the
appellate decision maker. 45
¶13
In fact, the empirical evidence shows that precision and predictability has fallen since
the inception of the Federal Circuit. 46 The CAFC’s high rate of district court reversals show
that “pre-trial predictability” and “efficient patent litigation” remain a theoretical construct
rather than an attainable goal. 47 In one empirical critique of the Federal Circuit’s
predictability, even after years of claim construction as a matter of law, the results were
neatly summarized, “The reversal rate ought to be going down, not up.” 48

Oral Argument at 11:48, In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (2008) (No. 2007-1130), available at
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/oral-argument-recordings/all/bilski.html. See also Chief Judge Paul Redmond
Michel, Keynote Address at the Northwestern University Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property
Symposium (Mar. 6, 2015) ("Give me a good rule, give me a bad rule, just give me certainty.")
36
See Nard & Duffy, supra note 1, at 1621.
37
Abe Fortas, The Patent System in Distress, 53 J. PAT OFF. SOC’Y 810 (1971).
38
But see Moore, supra note 3, at 1 (advancing the argument that lack of technical experience among
district court judges is the reason for high reversal rates of claim construction).
39
See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Patent Law, the Federal Circuit, and the Supreme Court: A Quiet
Revolution, 11 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 74 (2004).
40
See id.
41
Id.
42
See, e.g., Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., 138 F.3d 1448, 1454-56 (Fed. Cir. 1998)(en banc)
43
See Lunney, supra note 39, at 76 n.192.
44
See Id.
45
See Dreyfuss, supra note 2, at 772-86; Kimberly A. Moore, Markman Eight Years Later: Is Claim
Construction More Predictable?, 9 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 231, 246-47 (2005); Nard & Duffy, supra note
1, at 1621.
46
See R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An Empirical
Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1163-70 (2004).
47
See Christian A. Chu, Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s Claim Construction Trends, 16
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1075, 1100 (2001).
48
Moore, supra note 45, at 246–47.
35
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The fault lies with the rule based approach. The language of a patent cannot be
technically and textually analyzed to provide a uniform meaning of its boundaries and
features. 49 A patent is not analogous to a deed or will that enumerates property rights in
physical and mathematical limits. 50 A patent claim sketches the intangible boundaries
between creations and innovations, naturally resistant to exceptionless rules and objective
interpretation. 51 The empirical evidence, a source of mathematical precision, suggests that
patent law is more predictable when pragmatic factor considerations are implemented,
rather than the CAFC’s trend of rule formalism. 52
II. PRAGMATISM AND THE SUPREME COURT

¶15

While many empirical studies of Federal Circuit precision have focused on claim
construction, other “key areas of expanding uncertainty” have emerged. 53 Such as: the
doctrine of equivalents, the written description requirement, and patentable subject
matter. 54 Until the summer of 2014, patent-eligible subject matter had been an area of great
difficulty for the CAFC. Starting with Bilski in 2010, the Supreme Court stepped in five
times over three years to vacate, reverse, or correct the CAFC’s rulings specifically on the
area patent eligible subject matter. 55 This was in contrast to the general trend of the
Supreme Court to stay away from patent law. 56
¶16
This battle between the CAFC’s formalist, rule-based approach and the Supreme
Court’s holistic, pragmatic approach is the ideal illustration to illuminate the institutional
and jurisprudential problems created by the CAFC’s refusal to incorporate policy
considerations into their decision making. The battle closes as proof of the uniformity and
predictability that can be achieved when the CAFC intertwines policy considerations into
the adjudication of patent disputes.
¶17
The constant overruling of the Federal Circuit by the Supreme Court could be
characterized as combative or creating tension. 57 However, when each case is viewed as a
piece of the saga described infra, the story reveals that the Supreme Court is attempting to
hand a pragmatic framework to the Federal Circuit. And in doing that, they are delegating
the job of creating a policy inculcated body of patent law to the institution with specialized
expertise, the Federal Circuit.

See Lunney, supra note 39, at 75.
See Id.
51
See Id.
52
See Id. at 78.
53
See Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2005)
54
See Id. at 40.
55
Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 130 S.Ct.
3543 (2010); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 132 S.Ct. 1289 (2012); Ass’n for Molecular
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 132 S.Ct. 1794 (2012); Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad
Genetics, Inc., 133 S.Ct. 2107 (2013).
56
The previous time the Supreme Court addressed patent-eligible subject matter, often considered the
threshold issue in patent disputes, was in Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981), before the creation of the
Federal Circuit.
57
See John M. Golden, The Supreme Court as "Prime Percolator": A Prescription for Appellate
Review of Questions in Patent Law, 56 UCLA L. Rev. 657, 668 & n.58 (2009); Dreyfuss, supra note 2, at
791.
49
50
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A. The Slippery Bilski Slope
As mentioned in Part I, the oral arguments in In re Bilski 58 clearly denote the
formalist tendencies of the Federal Circuit. However, the CAFC’s obvious commitment to
developing a bright-line rule for patent-eligible subject matter went beyond one passing
comment. The first third of the appellant’s oral argument was spent discussing which test
or hardline rule was controlling. 59 The court even went as far as asking counsel for the PTO
what test the patent office applied in 1952. 60 Considerations such as economic efficiency
of innovation or protecting and developing the storehouse of knowledge of mankind were
not discussed.
¶19
The opinion the CAFC released in Bilski echoes this sentiment. After dismissing the
Congressional definition of process, 61 and discussing several Supreme Court precedents
more than 25 years old, 62 the Federal Circuit filtered the underlying legal question as what
test or criteria governs the determination as to whether a claim to a process is patentable
under 35 U.S.C. §101 (2006). 63 Although the CAFC did consider other tests, 64 they ended
up deciding to “reaffirm that the machine or transformation test . . . is the governing test
for determining patent eligibility of a process under §101.” 65
¶20
The way the Supreme Court approached the issue in Bilski v. Kappos 66 was
drastically different. The petitioner opened his arguments by claiming that the “rigid and
narrow” machine or transformation test for all methods should be reversed. 67 The Justices
of the court responded with the logical follow-up of how such a broad, expansive test would
be applied to other everyday methods. 68 In fact, the court didn’t even mention the word
“test” until Justice Scalia asked about the patent-ineligible Bell patent, 69 which actually
¶18

545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
At various points the court remarked, “Are you advocating for the useful, concrete, and tangible
test?” (at 2:50); “Is transformation required under your rule” (at 4:18); “What do you consider the State
Street test to be?” (at 5:20); “That doesn’t sound like much of a test” (at 6:20); “Do we need a test in this
area?” (at 7:00); “Isn’t the test in Diehr from the Supreme Court, ‘transforming or reducing an article to a
different state or thing’?” (at 9:20); “We need to have some principle, or some test, or some factors, or
some way of drawing a line.” (at 16:23). Oral Argument, In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (2008) (No. 20071130), available at http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/oral-argument-recordings/all/bilski.html
60
Oral Argument at 44:05, In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (2008) (No. 2007-1130), available at
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/oral-argument-recordings/all/bilski.html. Even if such a test existed, trying to
apply a test used for technologies over half a century old to current day patents would not be in furtherance
of innovation and technological progress.
61
In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 951 n.3 (2008)(“Congress provided a definition of ‘process’. . . .
However, this provision is unhelpful given that the definition itself uses the term ‘process’”).
62
Id. at 951-55.
63
Id. at 955.
64
Namely the Freeman-Walter-Abele test; the useful, concrete, and tangible test; the technological
arts test; and “others not so enumerated.” Bilski, 545 F.3d at 958-61.
65
Id. at 956.
66
561 U.S. 593 (2010).
67
Oral Argument at 0:19, Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010) (No. 08-964)(arguing the test was
contrary to the principle that §101 “should be read broadly to accommodate unforeseen advances in the
useful arts.”).
68
Including: “So an estate plan, tax avoidance, how to resist a corporate takeover, how to choose a
jury, all of those are patentable?” Ginsberg, J. (at 3:40); “Anything that helps any businessman succeed is
patentable because we reduce it to a number of steps, explain it in general terms, file our application,
granted?” Breyer, J. (at 4:40); “Why not patent the method of speed dating?” Sotomayor, J. (at 5:45). Oral
Argument, Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010) (No. 08-964).
69
See Dolbear v. American Bell Tel. Co., 126 U.S. 1 (1888)
58
59
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met the machine or transformation test. 70 The petitioner ended their argument with an
appeal to disregard the machine or transformation test as the sole decision maker of
patentable subject matter; instead focusing the analysis on whether an abstract idea is
attempting to be patented. 71
¶21
This analysis of abstract idea preemption as opposed to a hardline test, was adopted
in the Supreme Court’s opinion. The Court emphasized that the case law adopting the
exceptions of laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas to §101 patent eligible
subject matter was not a license for the judiciary to impose other rules inconsistent with
the statute’s purpose and design. 72 The CAFC’s adoption of “the machine or transformation
test as the sole test for what constitutes a ‘process’ (as opposed to just an important and
useful clue) violates” the statute’s purpose and design. 73 The Court went on to acknowledge
that the standards for granting patents do change, because times and technology change,
and that patent law should be a body of law that is flexible to change. 74 Especially § 101,
which is a “dynamic provision designed to encompass new and unforeseen inventions.” 75
By applying a rigid test, such as the machine or transformation test, a court would “risk
obscuring the larger object of securing patents for valuable inventions without
transgressing the public domain.” 76
¶22
Concluding the lengthy discussion about the merits of the patent system, the Court
refused to adopt a “categorical rule[] that might have wide-ranging and unforeseen
impact.” 77 Rather, the Court affirmed the ruling of patent-ineligibility in this case, on the
grounds that it claimed an abstract idea. 78 However, after categorically refuting the
CAFC’s jurisprudence on patent-eligible subject matter, 79 the Supreme Court
acknowledged that “patent law faces a great challenge in striking the balance between
protecting inventors and not granting monopolies over procedures that others would
discover by. . .application of general principles.” 80 The Court refused to take a position on
where that balance lies, and instead directed the Federal Circuit to take a cost/benefit
approach in using their decisions to direct the balance. 81 The Court knew that this was just
the start of defining the bounds of patent-eligible subject matter under § 101, and wanted
to delegate the computer software and medical diagnostic techniques to the specialized

Oral Argument at 24:28, Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010) (No. 08-964).
Oral Argument at 53:28, Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010) (No. 08-964).
72
See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 603 (2010).
73
See Id.
74
See Id. at 605.
75
Id.
76
Id. at 606.
77
Id. at 609.
78
See Id.
79
Id. at 612 (“[N]othing in today’s opinion should be read as endorsing interpretations of §101 that
the [CAFC] has used in the past”).
80
Id. at 606.
81
Id. (“Section 101’s terms suggest that new technologies may call for new inquiries.”)
70
71
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court, the Federal Circuit. 82 Albeit, with the intention the CAFC would consider those
technologies in light of the policy-integrated approach the Court used in Bilski. 83
B. Confusion in the Mayo Days
When the Supreme Court initially received the appeal for Prometheus v. Mayo 84 they
granted certiorari, vacated the CAFC’s holding, and remanded for reconsideration in light
of their holding in Bilski. 85 This was a pretty clear sign that the Supreme Court intended
for the CAFC to shift its decision making away from rule formalism and towards a more
policy oriented approach. The CAFC missed the sign.
¶24
After acknowledging that the Supreme Court rejected the machine or transformation
test as the definitive rule for determining the patent-eligibility of a method claim, 86 the
CAFC proceeded to decide Mayo definitively under the machine or transformation test.87
The CAFC decided the Supreme Court’s decisions did not dictate a change in their
adjudication process, 88 and that the preemption of a law of nature was not a concern,
because the patent in question related to an application of that law. 89
¶25
In their second reversal of the CAFC’s Mayo ruling, the Supreme Court applied a
policy intertwined reasoning similar to their opinion in Bilski. Starting with a discussion of
the storehouse of public knowledge, the Court made clear that a rigid inquiry would be
made to patents asserting methods comprising laws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas. 90 In pointing to a century of Supreme Court precedents, the Court warned
against interpreting patent statutes as a series of rules that would make “patent eligibility
depend simply on the draftsman’s art.” 91 Rather, the “principles under lying the prohibition
against patents for laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” should be
focused on. 92 While recognizing that the patent system exists to promote innovation and
reward costly research into new discoveries, the danger of inhibiting future innovation
becomes realized when a “patented process amounts to no more than an instruction to apply
the natural law.” 93 It was a long established precedent that patents that “claim processes

¶23

Oral Argument at 49:50, Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010) (No. 08-964). “This case would
provide an unsuitable vehicle for resolving the hard questions because the case doesn’t involve computer
software or medical diagnostic techniques, and therefore. . .you will decide this case, and most of the hard
questions remain unresolved.” (Argument by Malcolm Stewart); “But this case could be decided without
making any bold step. . .Even the Federal Circuit didn’t say it was the test. It said it is for now. We know
that things we haven’t yet contemplated may be around the corner, and when they happen, we will deal
with them.” (Response by Ginsberg, J.).
83
See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 130 S.Ct. 3543 (2010).
84
See Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 581 F.3d 1336 (2009).
85
See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 130 S.Ct. 3543 (2010).
86
See Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 628 F.3d 1347, 1352 (2010).
87
Id. at 1355 (“[T]he treatment methods claimed in Prometheus’s patent in suit satisfy the
transformation prong of the machine or transformation test.”).
88
Id. (“We do not think that either the Supreme Court’s GVR Order or the Court’s Bilski decision
dictates a wholly different analysis.”)
89
See Id.
90
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S.Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012)
(“Monopolization of those tools through the grant of a patent might tend to impede innovation more than it
would tend to promote it.”).
91
Id. at 1294.
92
Id.
93
Id. at 1301.
82
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that too broadly preempt the use of a natural law” should be invalidated. 94 In closing their
opinion, the Supreme Court reiterated the balancing act that the judiciary (and the CAFC
is surely no exception) must apply in deciding the complex social issues inevitably tied up
in patent disputes. 95
¶26
The contrast of the different oral arguments used in Mayo, at the different stages of
the appellate process, highlights the uncertainty created by the split jurisprudence of the
competing high courts of patent law. One appellant, arguing before the Federal Circuit,
opened his argument with, “There are many different ways to think about this case, all of
which involving machines and transformations of matter.” 96 While one petitioner, arguing
before the Supreme Court, opened his argument with, “The problem with the Prometheus
patent is its broad preemption of a physical phenomenon, which prevents others like Mayo
Clinic from offering a better metabolite test with more accurate numbers. And this is a
huge practical problem for patients.” 97 While the CAFC’s questions focused on the
machine or transformation test, 98 the Supreme Court’s line of questioning circled around
the idea of the preemption of a natural law and the negative real-life consequences that
could have. 99 With one high court arguing form over function and the other applying a
pragmatic outlook to resolving disputes, the increase in success rate variance makes
sense. 100
¶27
When the Supreme Court originally received the appeal from Ass’n for Molecular
Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office 101 they granted certiorari, vacated the
CAFC’s holding, and remanded in light of the Court’s decision in Mayo, a familiar
pattern. 102 Following the Supreme Court’s remand, the CAFC accepted additional briefing
and held an en banc argument. 103 While the Supreme Court’s holding in Mayo, did not

See Id. at 1294.
Id. at 1305 (“Patent protection is after all, a two-edged sword. On the one hand, the promise of
exclusive rights provides monetary incentives that lead to creation, invention, and discovery. On the other
hand, that very exclusivity can impede the flow of information that might permit, indeed spur, invention,
by, for example, raising the price of using the patented ideas once created, requiring potential users to
conduct costly and time-consuming searches of existing patents and pending patent applications, and
requiring the negotiation of complex licensing arrangements.”)
96
Oral Argument at 1:54, Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 628 F.3d 1347 (2010)
(No. 2008-1403).
97
Oral Argument at 0:30, Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S.Ct. 1289 (2012)
(No. 10-1150).
98
Near the end of oral arguments, the court asked, “But when you administer the thiopurine. . .doesn’t
it effect a transformation, which is the Bilski case?” When the appellees admitted that it did in the narrow
context, he was cut off mid-sentence with, “Well QED. Isn’t that the answer then? For §101.” Oral
Argument at 40:43, Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 628 F.3d 1347 (2010) (No. 20081403).
99
“I think that the difference that people are noting. . .all you have done is pointed out a set of facts
that exist in the world, and are claiming protection for something that anybody can try to make use of in
any way, and you are saying you have to pay us.” (Kagan, J. at 46:00); “Suppose somebody thinks you’re
wrong, that the numbers you’ve come up with are wrong. And they want to develop better numbers that
will—will help the medical profession. Your patent occludes them from doing that.” (Scalia, J. at 53:15)
Oral Argument, Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S.Ct. 1289 (2012) (No. 101150).
100
See supra Part I.
101
476 Fed. Appx. 890 (2012).
102
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 132 S.Ct. 1794 (2012).
103
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303, 1308 (2012).
94
95
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track directly on to the claims most at issue in Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 104 the
Supreme Court still insisted that the Federal Circuit reconsider its holding in light of the
Mayo decision. 105 This might seem puzzling until viewed in the light of the battling
methodologies that headlined the competing decisions and arguments in Bilski and Mayo.
¶28
If the Supreme Court wanted the CAFC to apply a similar policy oriented approach
in considering the pragmatic ramifications of different holdings involving patent eligible
subject matter, it would do so by asking the Federal Circuit to reconsider its previous policy
inculcated rationales. Rather than define a rule that might turn out to be too broad or narrow
as new technologies entered the scope of patent law, the Supreme Court was trying to get
the CAFC to adopt more of a balancing approach that was displayed in the Bilski and Mayo
holdings. 106 Again, the CAFC missed the sign.
¶29
The CAFC started their opinion with a discussion of what the case was not about.
Completely shutting out the societal considerations 107 that the Supreme Court wanted them
to balance, the CAFC focused their analysis on whether the claims “meet the threshold test
for patent-eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. §101.” 108 The CAFC also rejected the
argument that because the particular composition of matter in this case was more analogous
to information—based on its use to a person having ordinary skill in the art—and
information being unequivocally unpatentable would render these claims covering patenteligible subject matter. 109 The CAFC did not consider the implications of allowing a patent
on information, 110 rather they analyzed the claims under the same lens as any other
composition of matter: a series of atoms joined by covalent bonds. 111 When presented with
the argument that allowing a patent on these naturally occurring molecules would preempt
others from researching and exploring these fundamental concepts of nature, similar to the
rationale used in Mayo, 112 the Federal Circuit stated that because the claims here were
objects (which happened to be objects found in nature), not laws of nature, this preemption

104
The holding in Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S.Ct. 1289 (2012) dealt
with the methodology that should be used in deciding the patent-eligible nature of method claims that
comprise laws of nature under §101. By contrast, the main claims at issue in for Molecular Pathology v.
U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 476 Fed. Appx. 890 (2012) dealt with the patent-eligible nature of
compositions of matter that may occur in nature under §101.
105
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 132 S.Ct. 1794 (2012).
106
Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 606 (2010); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc.,
132 S.Ct. 1289, 1305 (2012).
107
“It is important to state what this appeal is not about. It is not about whether individuals suspected
of having an increased risk of developing breast cancer are entitled to a second opinion. Nor is about
whether [the patent holder] has acted improperly in its licensing or enforcement policies. . .The question is
also not whether is it desirable for one company to hold a parent or license covering a test that may save
people’s lives.” Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303, 1324
(2012).
108
Id.
109
Id. at 1330.
110
Id. (“Whether its unusual status as a chemical entity that conveys genetic information warrants
singular treatment under the patent laws. . .is a policy question that we are not entitled to address.”)
111
See Id. at 1328.
112
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S.Ct. 1289, 1294 (2012). “The remand
for this case for reconsideration in light of Mayo, might suggest. . .that the composition claims are mere
reflections of a law of nature. . .[T]hey are not, any more than any product of man reflects and is consistent
with a law of nature. Everything and everyone comes from nature, following its laws.” Ass’n for Molecular
Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303, 1331 (2012).
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argument was without merit. 113 In other words, the arguments and reasoning in Mayo did
not apply, because this case was not Mayo.
¶30
The second time the Supreme Court granted certiorari they were more explicit about
the balancing tests they wanted to employ in the §101 analysis, “[P]atent protections strike
a delicate balance between creating ‘incentives that lead to creation, invention, and
discovery’ and ‘impeding the flow of information that might permit, indeed spur,
invention.’” 114 Perhaps, to underline that this is the same pragmatic balancing approach
the Supreme Court had been using for the last four years, they added the line, “We must
apply this well-establish standard to determine whether Myriad’s patents claim [patenteligible subject matter].” 115
¶31
In applying this standard the Supreme Court reversed in part, and affirmed in part
the Federal Circuit’s rulings of patent eligibility. 116 This time the message was clear, there
is no line where on one side patent eligible subject matter lies, and on the other lies patentineligible subject matter. It must be a holistic determination weighing the social
implications on either side of the decision, coming down on whichever course best
coincides with the purpose and design of the Patent Act.
C. Affirmed Agreement in Alice Corp.
¶32

This time the CAFC noticed the sign. In CLS Bank v. Alice Corp. the CAFC dealt en
banc with determining whether method claims related to business practice and computer
programs were directed to patent eligible subject matter. 117 First, the Federal Circuit
admitted its jumbled and confusing §101 jurisprudence over the previous years. 118 Next,
the CAFC outlined, in plain language, the steps in conducting a §101 inquiry. 119 The CAFC
explained the previous unpredictability in differentiating claims that would preempt laws
of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas from claims that “embody, use, reflect, rest
upon, or apply” those fundamental tools can be resolved by reliance on the Supreme
Court’s §101 jurisprudence. 120 And that while these applications may “feel subjective and
unsystematic” and trending “towards the metaphysical, littered with unhelpful analogies
and generalizations”, the Supreme Court’s framework provides predictability for
practitioners. 121

Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303, 1331 (2012)
(“That is true of all inventions; during the term of the patent, unauthorized parties are ‘preempted’ from
practicing the patent, but only for its limited term.”).
114
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S.Ct. 2107, 2116 (2013).
115
Id.
116
See Id. at 2107.
117
See CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 717 F.3d 1269 (2013).
118
Id. at 1276 (“Section 101 appears deceptively simple on its face, yet its proper application to
computer-implemented inventions and in various other fields of technology has long vexed this and other
courts.”)
119
“We must first ask whether the claimed invention is a process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter. If not, the claim is ineligible under §101. If the invention falls within one of the
statutory categories, we must then determine whether any of the three judicial exceptions nonetheless bars
such a claim—is the claim drawn to a patent-ineligible law of nature, natural phenomenon, or abstract idea?
If so the claim is not patent eligible. Only claims that pass both inquiries satisfy §101.” Id. at 1277.
120
Id.
121
Id.
113
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This framework turns primarily on the pragmatic likelihood of a claim preempting a
law of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract idea from the common repository of
mankind. 122 “First and foremost is an abiding concern that patents should not be allowed
to preempt the fundamental tools of discovery—those must remain ‘free to all and reserved
exclusively to none.’” 123 The Federal Circuit even recognized that “overly formalistic
approaches to subject-matter eligibility[] invite manipulation” and result in holdings that
run in contradiction of the purpose and design of patent law. 124 In response to the newly
realized policy integrated approach to patent-eligible subject matter, the Supreme Court
affirmed the holdings of Alice Corp. 125
III. MOVING PAST PATENT-ELIGIBLE SUBJECT MATTER

¶34

Now that the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court agree on a function-over-form,
practical methodology of determining patent-eligible subject matter that weighs societal
ramifications, predictability will return and the variance of the rate of successful appeals
should decrease. 126 However, §101 patent-eligible subject matter is just one facet of patent
law. The other “key areas of expanding uncertainty” still exist, namely claim construction,
doctrine of equivalents, and written description. 127
A. The Framework for Pragmatism

¶35

From the example in Part II, the Supreme Court in Bilski v. Kappos grew its
pragmatic arguments from the pre-existing law of four areas of patent-eligible subject
matter and the three exceptions. 128 By starting from that framework, the Court was able to
tie in concerns about preempting others from applying laws of nature and reserving tools
of innovation to the public domain so that they may be available to all and exclusive to
none. 129 Once those policy considerations were established within pre-existing law, the
Supreme Court was able to expand upon them in Mayo and Myriad by enumerating a
balancing test that weighed rewarding those who discover new and useful things with the
danger of granting patents that would inhibit future innovation. 130 Using the evolution of
See Id.
Id. at 1280.
124
Id. at 1281 (“Finally, the cases urge a flexible, claim-by-claim approach to subject-matter
eligibility that avoids rigid line drawing. Bright-line rules may be simple to apply, but they are often
impractical and counterproductive when applied to §101. Such rules risk becoming outdated in the fact of
continual advances in technology—they risk ‘freezing process patents to old technologies , leaving no room
for the revelations of the new, onrushing technology.’ Stringent eligibility formulas may also lead to
misplaced focus, requiring courts to ‘pose questions of such intricacy and refinement that they risk
obscuring the larger object of securing patents for valuable inventions without transgressing the public
domain.’”)
125
See Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S.Ct. 2347 (2014).
126
See Lunney, supra nota 39, at 74 (noting that a lower variance in appellate success rate translates to
higher predictability).
127
See supra Part II.
128
The four areas of statutory patent-eligible subject matter: process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, while keeping in mind the three judicially crafted exceptions of laws of nature,
natural phenomena, or abstract ideas. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 606 (2010).
129
See Id.
130
See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs, Inc., 132 S.Ct. 1289, 1301 (2012); Ass’n for
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S.Ct. 2107, 2116 (2013).
122
123

251

NOR THWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLEC TUAL PROPER TY

[2016

patent-eligible subject matter jurisprudence as a model, the courts can work on solidifying
other "key areas of uncertainty." The idea is to construct arguments that start from current,
existing formalistic law and add layers of considerations that derive from social and policyorientated rationales.
B. The Current Doctrine of Equivalents
¶36

For example, the doctrine of equivalents is one of the sources of expanding
uncertainty, and it is almost always raised in an infringement suit as patent holders seek to
broaden their monopoly. 131 But without it, entrepreneurs looking to profit off of
innovators’ ingenuity invariably instigate unfair market advantages. The doctrine
essentially says that if the alleged infringing product does not literally infringe the terms
of the patent, there may still be infringement of the patent if it's close enough.
¶37
To make this determination of "close enough" the Federal Circuit applies a variety
of formalistic tests. Early doctrine of equivalents case law set a tripartite test that analyzed
if the allegedly infringing elements if they "perform[] substantially the same function in
substantially the same way to obtain the same result." 132 The tripartite test remained for
several decades before being slightly amended by the Federal Circuit in Warner-Jenkinson
Co., Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co. 133 In that case, the CAFC stated that "the doctrine
of equivalents rests on the substantiality of the differences between the claimed and
accused products or processes assessed according to an objective standard." While not
explicitly rejecting the Federal Circuit's test nor rejecting the tripartite test, the Supreme
Court reversed the holding in Warner-Jenkinson and held that "[d]ifferent linguistic
frameworks may be more suitable to different cases, depending on their particular facts."134
To this day, arguments are made in front of the Federal Circuit that apply both the tripartite
test and the equally formalistic Warner-Jenkinson test.
¶38
Without delving deeper into the history of the doctrine of equivalents, it suffices to
say that it has not always been applied in a predictable manner. 135 To show the pros and
cons of broad and narrow applications of the doctrine of equivalents, suppose an inventor
"A" in the late 1990s claimed a machine that included an interface with a laptop computer.
Years later, another inventor "B" started using that same invention, but with an interface
to a tablet computer. A would argue the doctrine of equivalents precludes B from using her
machine because the tablet is an equivalent of the laptop. B would argue that the
substitution of a tablet is unique enough and adds some value to the machine outside of
what A originally claimed.
¶39
With a broad application of the doctrine of equivalents B would be blocked from
pursuing a potentially beneficial invention and disclosing it to the public for their benefit.
With a narrow application, all of A's hard work and resources in inventing his machine

131
See John R. Thomas, Claim Re-Construction: The Doctrine of Equivalents in the Post-Markman
Era, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 153, 154 (2005).
132
Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950)
133
62 F.3d 1512 (1995).
134
Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., 520 U.S. 17, 40 (1997)
135
See Michael J. Meurer & Craig Allen Nard, 93 Geo. L.J. 1947, 1948-49 (2005)("Perhaps no
doctrine in patent law is as controversial as the Doctrine of Equivalents[]. Despite nearly two hundred years
of development, patent law lacks a coherent vision of a doctrine that holds great intuitive appeal.")
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would be lost as competitors could use his invention by changing the type of computer
involved.
¶40
Worse yet, if an uneven application of the doctrine is used both sets of negative
consequence would result. Computer science changes at such a rate that the fear of a narrow
application of the doctrine of equivalents would disincentivize inventors from expending
the resources to invent. Their patents would not hold exclusivity long enough to recoup
investment costs because of the natural progression of the art. At the same time, B would
not pursue her invention for fear that a broad application of the doctrine of equivalents
would open her up to litigation liability. This uncertainty in the law prevents the public
from access to potential advances in the art and slows progress.
C. Application of the Framework for Pragmatism
¶41

¶42

¶43

¶44

¶45

¶46

To bring precision to this area of patent law, arguments should avoid the temptation
of being centered on formalistic attempts to cabin abstract ideas. Rather, a pragmatic
approach that takes into account policy considerations and economic reasoning is more
likely to bring precision. For example, a sliding scale balancing test that weighs the rate of
change, the amount of unpredictability, and the cost of experimentation within the art
would provide judges with a range of considerations on which to decide within the best
designs and intentions of the patent act.
The first factor of this balancing test is the rate of change in the relevant art. The
faster the change in the art, the broader the application of the doctrine of equivalents should
be. The substitution of a tablet for a laptop is the product of the rapid advancement of
computer science and should be seen as equivalents. In contrast, an art that changes slower
than the lightspeed progress of computer science—such as organic chemistry—should
have a narrower application of the doctrine of equivalents.
The second factor of this balancing test is the amount of unpredictability in the
relevant art. The more unpredictable the art is, the more likely it is that an equivalent
element would fall outside the literal limitations of a patent claim. Therefore more
unpredictable arts should have a broader doctrine of equivalents scope as opposed to arts
where the claim drafter should have been able to adequately state the limits of her claim.
The final factor of this balancing test is the cost of experimentation. If
experimentation in a particular field has higher costs there is a greater danger of an
equivalent claim element preventing recoup of investment capital. In order to keep
incentives for inventors intact, a broader scope of the doctrine of equivalents should be
applied to arts that require a greater investment of resources.
Conceivably, there is some overlap between these factors. The rate of progress in an
art would be plausibly related to how predictable experimentation would be. Similarly, the
unpredictability of that experimentation would often be correlated to the cost of
experimentation. That is not a problem. The idea is to give the judges flexibility to the
policy and economic considerations into their judgment, regardless of how the policy and
economic considerations blend against each other.
The same principles of traditional doctrine of equivalents tests would still be applied
in combination with these factors. In the A and B example, the balancing test would lean
on the side of sliding the scale for doctrine of equivalents towards a broader, more
encompassing scope. However, if the new technology added something substantially new,

253

NOR THWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLEC TUAL PROPER TY

[2016

so that some different result was achieved or the result was achieved in a different way,
there would be no infringement.
¶47
This is one example of applying the lessons learned from the progression of patenteligible subject matter to increase precision in patent law. There are other ways to apply
these lessons in other areas of uncertainty in patent law. The Federal Circuit being a
specialized judiciary, charged to be the uniform voice of patent law, is in the prime position
to instigate this charge for precision.
CONCLUSION
¶48

Decades before the creation of the Federal Circuit, arguments were made that a
specialized appellate court to hear patent cases was needed. 136 There were two purposes
for this specialized court. One, to bring uniformity (and thereby precision) to a nationwide
system of patent law. Two, after hearing more patent cases than any other court, this
specialized court would be able to use their expertise to effectuate changes in patent law
that would be beneficial to the system. The CAFC attempted to accomplish these goals by
a rigid formalistic application of rules. Empirical evidence has shown that this was not
effective. 137 Worse still, was when the CAFC continued this formalist jurisprudence in the
face of Supreme Court decision making that adopted a more policy laden approach.
¶49
Now that the Supreme Court has shown how to merge the formalistic precedents of
patent law, with modern day pragmatic considerations, it is the Federal Circuit’s role to
apply those principles to other doctrines besides patent-eligible subject matter. As
discussed in Part II, the Supreme Court tried to get the Federal Circuit to take that role in
their Bilski and Mayo opinions. This has always been one of the functions the Federal
Circuit was designed to play, as shown from the first deliberations around the creation of
a specialized patent court that began in the 19th century. By accepting these multidimensional arguments, laden with realist concerns, the Federal Circuit can fulfill its other
function: bringing predictability to patent law.

136
137
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